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Abstract
Employment to population ratios differ markedly across Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries,
especially for people aged over 55 years. In addition, social security
features differ markedly across the OECD, particularly with respect to
features such as generosity, entitlement ages, and implicit taxes on so-
cial security benefits. This study postulates that differences in social
security features explain many differences in employment to population
ratios at older ages. This conjecture is assessed quantitatively with a
life cycle general equilibrium model of retirement. At ages 60–64 years,
the correlation between the simulations of this study’s model and ob-
served data is 0.67. Generosity and implicit taxes are key features to
explain the cross-country variation, whereas entitlement age is not.
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1 Introduction
There are large cross-country differences in employment to population ratios
for those aged 20-75 years in the OECD. Turkey had the lowest ratio of 42% in
2006, whereas Norway had a ratio of 66%, the highest in the OECD. These dif-
ferences are an order of magnitude bigger than differences found over a typical
business cycle in OECD countries. These big differences are much larger for
people more than 50 years, with the lowest ratio of 13% found in Hungary and
the highest of 60% in New Zealand. These differences coexist with big cross-
country differences in social security programs. Differences in three features
seem particularly relevant. First, the replacement rate, a common measure of
how generous social security is, was 38% in Mexico, but 124% in Turkey, in
2006. Second, entitlement age to social security benefits was 55 years in Aus-
tralia but 67 years in Norway, a 12-year difference. Third, some countries allow
individuals to work while collecting social security whereas other countries do
not and yet others discourage it to some degree. Among the last group, the
US imposes an “earnings test” that penalizes collecting social security while
working. This study refers to these three features as generosity, entitlement
age, and implicit taxes.
This study seeks to answer two questions. First, can differences in social
security features account for large differences in employment to population at
older ages? Second, what features of social security are key to accounting for
those differences? The answer to these questions is key to assessing current
policy debate on social security reform in aging societies. In addition, it is a
good exercise to validate whether a standard model of policy evaluation can
deliver cross-country differences in employment at older ages as we see in the
data.
This study develops a life cycle general equilibrium model of retirement with a
discrete labor choice, idiosyncratic labor income risk, and incomplete markets
to answer these questions. The model is calibrated to match key statistics of
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the US economy and its social security system. The model captures much of
the heterogeneity in employment by age found in the data. Therefore, dif-
ferences in social security account for many differences in employment and
simulating counterfactuals allows for an inquiry about the importance of each
social security feature considered. Idiosyncratic labor income risk is a mech-
anism to produce individuals making different retirement decisions, as we see
in the data. For example, in the US, 60% of 62-year-old people still work, as
do 40% of 65-year-olds, regardless of the discouraging effect of social security.
Differences in social security account for two thirds of the differences in employ-
ment to population at ages 60–64 years and 65–69 years. Through variations
in only three features of social security, the model is able to match the em-
ployment age profile for people aged more than 50 years for many countries in
the sample. A useful way to summarize this finding is by using the coefficient
of variation of employment to population across OECD countries by age. At
ages 60–64 years, differences in social security account for most of the differ-
ences in employment to population as the coefficient of variation is 0.32 in the
data and 0.38 in the model. Similarly, at ages 65–69 years, the coefficient is
0.49 in the data and 0.56 in the model. Using different assessments, this study
consistently documents the crucial importance of the incentives that social se-
curity systems provide to people older than 50 years. Furthermore, the model
predicts accurately average employment to population of the OECD relative
to the US. At 60–64 years, the model predicts the same average employment
to population relative to the US as in the data.
Among the three social security features explored, the study finds that vari-
ation in generosity and implicit taxes are able to account for most of the
differences in employment to population at older ages, whereas differences in
entitlement ages are not. This is an important result, as many policymakers
believe that increasing retirement age is the way to increase employment to
population ratios at older ages. Their intuition is backed up by many reduced
form regressions, which find a positive correlation between entitlement ages
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and retirement ages; however, they do not take into account that savings de-
cisions change dramatically under different social security systems. Reduced
form regressions abstract from the fact that social security reforms in any
country trigger changes in savings behavior that results in potentially differ-
ent retirement behavior. If a government decides to increase entitlement age,
people increase savings over their life so they can retire when they plan to and
not when they are told to. As a result, people’s planned retirement age does
not change that much. However, increasing entitlement age is definitely not
a bad policy as it would not change retirement age substantially but it would
reduce the fiscal burden governments face to finance PAYGO social security
systems.
This study shuts down each feature of social security to US levels, one at
a time, to explore which social security feature is more important. In addi-
tion, it simulates every possible combination of features to explore how they
interact. The coefficient of variation of employment to population at ages
60–64 years in the model is 0.12 when there are differences in generosity or
implicit taxes only. In contrast, the coefficient of variation is 0.07 when there
are differences in the entitlement age only. Either generosity or implicit taxes
account for one third of the variability in the model alone but they explain
most of the variability when they interact. In addition, the model accurately
predicts labor supply profiles for many countries in the sample, capturing both
variability and employment to population rates relative to the US.
This study is most related to two streams of literature. The first follows
Prescott (2004), who seeks to explain large differences in hours of work per
person through differences in the average tax rates for G-7 economies through
the lenses of the neoclassical growth model. Rogerson (2007) extends Prescott
(2004)’s analysis to study why Scandinavian countries work too much for their
level of taxes. He finds that studying how these taxes are spent is key to un-
derstanding their effects on hours of work. Ohanian et al. (2008), following
Prescott (2004), document trends and cross-country differences in labor supply
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in more detail, for a longer time span, and for as many OECD countries for
which data is available. Taxes and transfers play a major role in accounting
for trend and cross-country differences in hours of work per person. McDaniel
(2011) studies the relative importance of differences in taxes and productivity
to account for differences in hours of work per person, confirming that taxes re-
main the major source of variation in hours of work across countries. Similarly,
Ragan (2013) studies the role of taxes and transfers, using a household model,
to account for time use patterns across countries and time. She finds that pub-
lic expenditure, in the form of provision of home goods, is key to understanding
patterns of time use, in particular, home production time. This major effect
of taxes and transfers on the use of time not only circumscribes to a represen-
tative household that lives forever. For example, Bicks & Fuchs-Schuendeln
(2014) document large cross-country differences in hours of work for married
females using a static model of joint family labor decisions. They find that
a model of family labor supply that takes into account the full nonlinearity
of taxes, in particular second earner taxation, accounts for a substantial frac-
tion of these cross-country differences. It is only a natural extension to study
how specific features of social security impact the labor supply of older people.
Two recent studies are close to the present work. Wallenius (2013) analyzes
the importance of PAYGO social security systems to understand life cycle la-
bor supply across OECD countries. Her framework is based on previous work
by Prescott el al. (2009) and Rogerson & Wallenius (2009), which develop
a framework to deal with labor supply in the extensive and intensive margin
all together. Wallenius (2013)’s model is extended to include human capital
accumulation decisions. She finds that differences in social security programs
play a substantial role in accounting for cross-country differences in average
retirement ages but they do not seem to play a significant role in accounting
for differences in hours of work of prime age individuals. Relative to Wallenius
(2013), this study introduces idiosyncratic labor income and mortality risks
and is applied to a larger sample of countries. Another important difference
is that this study focuses on changing features of social security rather than
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imposing one country’s social security system on another. A growing body of
literature identifies the importance of considering idiosyncratic labor income
risks to study the role of taxes and transfers, to account for cross-country la-
bor supply differences1. Therefore, it seems a good idea to explore the role of
social security programs in accounting for retirement behavior in this context.
The closest reference to this work is Erosa et al. (2012). They analyze the
role of social security programs in combination with disability insurance to
account for the employment to population of older people across the OECD.
They find that social security plays a central role in accounting for labor mar-
ket behavior of older people but disability insurance does not seem to play
a role for most of the countries in their sample. By comparison, this study
focuses on a much larger sample of countries and investigates which features
of social security are most important to account for cross-country variations
in employment to population at older ages. In the framework of Erosa et al.
(2012), radical reforms are analyzed, as in Wallenius (2013), such as intro-
ducing the French system into the US. By comparison, the framework of this
study allows us to evaluate the effects of gradual changes in social security
rules, such as generosity, entitlement ages, and implicit taxes. In terms of
matching cross-country differences in labor supply of older people, we reach
quantitatively similar conclusions.
The second stream of literature uses reduced form econometric models, mi-
crosimulation, and structural models. This literature is not surveyed here
because it is vast2. These studies analyze both positive and normative aspects
of social security. Relative to the reduced form literature, the model of this
study allows us to investigate how people change their behavior when social
security rules change and, relative to the microsimulation studies, this study
1For example, Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Guvenen et al. (2014).
2For example, Gustman & Steinmeier (1986), Stock & Wise (1990), Phelan & Rust
(1998), Hugget & Ventura (1999), Gruber & Wise (2004, 2007), French (2005), Coile &
Gruber (2007), Nishiyama & Smetters (2007), and French & Jones (2011), to mention just
a few important contributions to the study of social security.
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introduces preferences that are identical across countries and features general
equilibrium. French (2005) and French & Jones (2011) develop a model with
idiosyncratic labor income and health risk to study the role of social security
in accounting for retirement behavior in the US. This study finds similar re-
sults in a general equilibrium environment and it is applied to a large sample
of countries. The results show that the interaction of risk, market incomplete-
ness, and social security matter in order to understand retirement decisions.
2 Employment and Social Security in the OECD
This section presents empirical evidence for OECD countries in 2006 using
labor force statistics by age and sex from the OECD online database; social
security data from “Pensions at Glance 2009”; and productivity data from the
“Total Economy Database3.” Data were collected from the OECD on employ-
ment to population at ages 20–75, 50–54, 55–59, 60–64, 65–69, and 70–74 years
to study the role of social security in accounting for cross-country differences in
employment to population at older ages. Employment to population at 20–75
years, chosen to match the definition of total employment in this model, is not
the main objective of this study. However, it is useful as a benchmark to under-
stand the magnitude off cross-national differences in employment at older ages.
Figure 1 pictures employment to population at ages 60–64 years (b) com-
pared to the total employment to population (a). Employment to population
at 20–75 years in Turkey was 42%, the lowest across the OECD in 2006, and
Norway had the highest, at 66%. Differences became even larger for older indi-
viduals. Employment to population at ages 60–64 years was 13% in Hungary
and 60% in New Zealand. The US was at the upper end of the distribution
of employment, with employment to population at 20–75 years of 65% and
employment to population at 60–64 years of 55%.
The main hypothesis of this study is that differences in key features of social
security account for cross-country differences in employment to population of
3The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Center.
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Figure 1. Employment at 20-75 vs. 60-64
older people, but any social security program is made up of a complex set of
allocation rules, from individual characteristics (e.g., age; sex; marital, em-
ployment, and health statuses; and earnings histories) to payment. Tracking
every single aspect that may matter for retirement decisions would be unfea-
sible in a general equilibrium model, thus, I choose three main statistics that
are easily available to all: generosity, measured by replacement rates; enti-
tlement ages; and implicit taxes on earnings if individuals work and collect
social security at the same time. Other features of social security and tax
and transfer programs may be important for retirement. The most relevant
features and programs are differences in pension entitlements due to marital
status, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance. In fact, unemploy-
ment insurance is probably important as a bridge to retirement in European
countries, even more for European Mediterranean countries. There are many
countries whose pension entitlements differ, depending on marital status, for
example, spouses that are entitled to half of 401k in the US or part of social se-
curity benefits. In addition, there are specific pension schemes for professions
considered dangerous or filthy and specific social security rules that apply to
public employees in many countries. Taking these features into account would
greatly complicate the modeling of retirement decisions; thus, this study ab-
stracts from them. Disability insurance is potentially an important feature to
understand retirement decisions as our health and abilities to perform tasks
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deteriorate with age. Introducing disability insurance schemes make sense as
they can be used as a bridge to retirement, as can unemployment insurance. I
am not aware of any study that examines the interactions of social security and
unemployment insurance in a similar framework, although Erosa et al. (2012)
incorporate features of disability insurance and find that, even though there
are large cross-country differences in the rules governing disability insurance,
they do not seem to account for any relevant fraction of the large cross-country
differences in employment to population at older ages.
The three main social security features that this study explores are generos-
ity, entitlement ages, and implicit taxes. This is at odds with the empirical
literature, which uses accrual rates computed through actuarial techniques to
measure the disincentive created by a social security system on employment
at older ages. Using accrual rates would probably be better to capture the
marginal effects of social security but it would miss the main driving features.
The definition of generosity that this study uses is net replacement rate, the
ratio of net social security benefits to average life cycle earnings. The OECD
provides different measures of generosity but given that the model of this study
abstracts from other taxes, such as taxes on social security benefits, it makes
sense to use net replacement rates as a benchmark because they are the clos-
est measure of what an average individual gets out of his lifetime earnings to
spend on consumption after retirement. In addition, the definition is compat-
ible with the structure of the model used in this study4.
The entitlement age is defined by the social security law of each country. The
entitlement ages sometimes depend on sex and occupation. This study chooses
the first age at which a male is entitled to claim social security benefits. More
information can be found in the appendix. To simplify the computations, it is
assumed that implicit taxes for each country are a 0–1 variable. Two sources
are relied on to determine whether a country allows a person to collect social
security and work and to what extent. The fist source of information comes
4Other definitions of replacement rate are used in the computations, with similar results.
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from Duval (2003), who computes a measure of “taxes on continuing to work,”
based on social security rules on a subsample of OECD countries. To com-
plement this source, this study uses “Social Security around the World,” a
compilation of the rules governing social security systems for every country
that has one. Usually, this source provides information on whether social se-
curity allows for the collection of benefits and work at the same time. In this
study’s model, a country allows the collection of social security alongside work
if it is stated in “Social Security around the World.” Otherwise, the implicit
taxes computed by Duval are used and are assigned a 0 if his measure of im-
plicit tax is more than 50%. For a sensitivity analysis, Duval’s numbers are
again used and very similar results are obtained.
These three features are sufficient to capture differences in social security pro-
grams around the world and it will be shown that they account for a substan-
tial amount of cross-country differences in employment to population at older
ages. A country that requires more years of employment to achieve full bene-
fits will have a smaller generosity. Figure 2(a) shows how large differences in
generosity across the OECD are, with net replacement rates ranging from 38%
in Mexico to 124% in Turkey. There are also large differences in entitlement
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Figure 2. Social Security Generosity and Entitlement Age
ages, as Figure 2(b) shows, which vary from 55 years in Australia to 67 years
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in Norway. Figure 3 shows Duval’s implicit taxes on continuing to work to
illustrate the differences in rules that allow for collecting social security while
the beneficiaries also work5. It is clear from Figure 3 that there is a lot of
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variability in implicit taxes.
3 Model Economy
This section describes assumptions about demographics, preferences, endow-
ments, technology, social security, and market structure.
3.1 Demographics
There is a stationary distribution of the population, N , which grows at a
constant rate n. People live a maximum number of A periods. In every period,
each individual faces an idiosyncratic probability of dying 1−sa, which depends
only on age. These assumptions induce a stationary population structure, in
which each age group is a constant fraction, µa, of a measure of the population
6.
5Numbers can be found in Appendix 1.
6This number is obtained with the following recursion: µa+1 =
sa+1
1+n µa with
∑
a µa = 1
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3.2 Preferences and Endowments
Preferences over sequences of consumption {ca} and leisure {1− ha} are iden-
tical across countries. Consumption must be positive and hours of work are
restricted to be either zero or h¯, as the objective of this study is the extensive
margin. The utility function to value uncertain streams of consumption and
leisure is standard and is written as
E0
[
A∑
a=1
βa−1
(
a∏
j=1
sj
)
u (ca, 1− ha)
]
3.3 Individual Productivity
People, indexed by i, are born identical to the economy but as they age, their
productivity (zi,a) changes. Productivity is determined through the interaction
of two different components and can be written as
zi,a = z
d
az
w
i,a
where zda is a deterministic component identical to every individual of the same
age and zwi,a is a stochastic component that follows a AR(1) that is written as
log(zwi,a+1) = ρ log(z
w
i,a) + i,a+1
where i,a −→ N(0, σ2 ) is iid across individuals.
3.4 Technology
There is a representative firm that operates a constant returns to scale tech-
nology to produce an homogeneous good, Y , using aggregate capital, K, and
aggregate efficiency units of labor, L. Aggregate capital depreciates at a con-
stant rate δ.
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3.5 Markets
There are markets for capital, labor, and product for every period but no
markets for insurance, borrowing, or lending (as in Aiyagary, 1994). Therefore,
individuals accumulate precautionary savings on top of life cycle savings.
3.6 Social Security
Social security is defined by two elements. The first is a payroll tax, τ , which is
levied on every worker. The second component is a function, φ(e¯a, ha, a), which
characterizes benefit payments and entitlement conditions. It is a function of
average life cycle earnings as the benefit amount replaces different average
earnings at a different rate. Progressive replacement rates are held at US
levels but average replacement rates are scaled up or down to each country.
Furthermore, the benefit function depends on labor choices because social
security rules in some countries may restrict the possibility of receiving benefits
while working. Furthermore, the function depends on age because individuals
are not entitled to receive social security until they reach an entitlement age,
aˆ. Further details about social security are given in the calibration section.
3.7 Accidental Bequests
People have an idiosyncratic probability of dying every period and they may
leave some assets unused. This study assumes that the government collects all
these assets and distributes them as a lump sum transfer among living people,
B.
3.8 Individual Decision
Individual decisions are written recursively. This study focuses on comparing
steady states, and thus, abstracts from the time subscript.
Individuals decide how much to consume, c; how much capital to save, k′;
and whether they work or not, h. In a steady state, taking interest rates, r,
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wages, w, payroll tax, τ , the social security benefit function, φ, and accidental
bequests, B, as given, each individual solves the following Bellman equation:
Va(k, z
w, e¯) = maxc,k′,h u(c, 1− h) + βsa+1Ezw [Va+1(k′, z′w, e¯′)]
s.t. c+ k′ = (1 + r)k + (1− τ)wzah+ φ(e¯, ha, a) +B
(1)
3.9 Aggregate State Variables
The aggregate state variables of the economy are a list of measures over indi-
vidual states {Ψa(k, zw, e¯)}. In a steady state, it is a function of the individual
state variables.
3.10 Steady State Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The individual state variables, other than age, are collected in a vector x =
(k, zw, e¯) to save some notation. A stationary recursive competitive equilib-
rium is a list of functions and scalars: ca(x), k
′
a(x), ha(x), Va(x), φ(e¯, ha, a),
Ψa(x), w, r, τ , K, L, and B, such that:
1. ca(x), k
′
a(x), ha(x),and Va(x) solve Equation (3) for every a = 1, ..., A.
2. K and L solve the representative firm profit maximization problem, so
input prices are given by the first order conditions: r = FK(K,L) − δ
and w = FL(K,L).
3. Markets clear
(a)
∑
a µa
∫
X
[ca(x) + k
′
a(x)] dΨa = F (K,L) + (1− δ)K,
(b)
∑
a µa
∫
X
k′a(x)dΨa = (1 + n)K, and
(c)
∑
a µa
∫
X
zaha(x)dΨa = L.
4. The aggregate state is consistent with individual behavior.
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5. Social security is balanced.
τL =
∑
a≥aˆ
µa
∫
X
φ(e¯, ha(x), a)dΨa
6. Accidental bequests are distributed evenly among living individuals.
∑
a
µa(1− sa+1)
∫
X
(1 + r)k′a(x)dΨa = B(1 + n)
4 Calibration
I calibrate the model to key features of the US economy. Some parameters are
chosen independently, relying on various data sources and previous research,
whereas other parameters are chosen within the model. Demographics, pro-
ductivity, fraction of time worked, labor share, and social security system are
calibrated independently. However, the depreciation rate, discount rate, inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution, and weight of leisure in the utility function
are chosen by solving the steady state equilibrium to match some key statistics
of the US economy.
4.1 Parameters Calibrated Independently
This study is required to choose the growth rate of the population, n; the age
when individuals enter the economy; the length of life, A; the probability of
survival, sa; the individual productivity process, zi,a; the labor share, α; the
fraction of time working, h¯; and the social security system.
4.1.1 Demographics
The growth rate of the population is set to be equal to the US historical
average of 1.2%, over the period 1960–2006. This number is taken from the
US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of 2009. Individuals are born to the
economy aged 20 years and die with a probability of 1 when they are 94 years.
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Therefore, the life span is A = 75. The probability of survival is taken from
actuarial tables, for males, provided by the US Social Security Administration,
in 2004, and it is used to derive stationary weights for the population in the
model. These two elements are displayed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Survival Rates and Population Weights
4.1.2 Individual productivity process
Individual productivity, zi,a, is characterized by two components: a determin-
istic component of age, zda, and a stochastic component, z
w
i,a.
To characterize the deterministic component, this study uses annual earnings
and annual hours worked for a sample of white non-disabled males with at least
a high school education from IPUMS-CPS7 over the period 1992–2006. The
sample selection is driven by the objective of isolating the incentive effects
of social security systems on retirement, and not by life–cycle labor supply
decisions that are driven by race, gender, or education. The study drops fe-
males because some of their choices are related to fertility, which are harder
to model8. High school dropouts are also left out of the sample because they
have remarkably different employment behavior and earnings dynamics that
7http://cps.ipums.org.
8It is worth noting that the deterministic component of productivity for males and fe-
males looks alike.
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would not map that well under the OECD assumption that individuals have
full careers beginning at age 20 years. It is a reasonable first step to start
without it as the model abstracts from permanent heterogeneity. Finally, it
abstracts from disabled individuals because they face a rather different set
of employment incentives because of disability insurance. Despite excluding
disability insurance, Erosa et al. (2012) show that disability insurance is rel-
atively unimportant.
The empirical literature usually decomposes annual earnings into age, time,
and cohort components. A well-known problem in this literature is that time
and cohort components cannot be identified separately, without very strong
assumptions. Hugget et al. (2011) decompose earnings under three different
hypotheses. They assume that either time effect or cohort effect is absent,
or that time effect and cohort effect are orthogonal. They find that none of
the assumptions significantly affects the estimation of the age component of
earnings. In the steady state, the time effect should be proportional to the
time variable, so this study assumes that earnings grow at a 2% rate due to
productivity gains9. Hourly wages are constructed by dividing annual earnings
and annual hours. Then, the ratio of mean hourly wage by age is computed to
mean hourly wage. This produces a hump-shaped profile that is used to fit a
quadratic polynomial over ages 20–65 years, as self selection sets in much more
strongly after entitlement ages. The polynomial is truncated to zero at age
80 years when it becomes negative10. The stochastic component of individual
productivity is characterized by an AR(1) stochastic process
log(zwi,a+1) = ρ log(z
w
i,a) + i,a+1
9Hugget et al. (2011) document a growth of wage per hour in the PSID of 1.5% for the
period 1969–1992.
10Note that this does not deliver very different results than assuming that the deterministic
component of the productivity is given by the average earnings by age relative to average
earnings, as is frequently done in the literature.
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with i,a+1
iid→ N(0, σ2 ). The parameters ρ and σ2 are taken from French &
Jones (2011) and equal 0.977 and 0.0141, respectively.
The fraction of time spent working, h¯, is set to 0.45 of available time in a
year. To calculate the available time, it is assumed that individuals can use
12 hours a day at work, delivering 4,380 hours in a year and 1,971 hours spent
at work.
4.1.3 Social security
The social security program is calibrated to the US. In my benchmark calibra-
tion, individuals start collecting benefits at age 62 years, the early entitlement
age in the US, but entitlement ages vary across countries in the simulations.
Many countries have an early entitlement age on top of a regular entitlement
age. This study abstracts from normal entitlement age to save computation
time. In the simulations, it is shown that differences in entitlement age cannot
account for much of the differences in employment to population at older ages.
In all probability, the inclusion of normal retirement ages would not change
the results by much.
This study assumes that the US has a zero implicit tax. If we use the im-
plicit tax on continuing to work obtained by Duval (2003) as a proxy for this
restriction, it is one of the smallest across the OECD at 12%. In the US, one
strong penalty for collecting social security while working was the “earnings
test,” a tax on social security benefits for individuals who claimed entitle-
ment before age 67 years, while still working. The test established two income
thresholds. After the first threshold, $1 of social security benefits were taxed
away for every $2 of labor earnings above the first threshold; and after the
second threshold, $1 of social security benefits were taxed away for every $3
of labor earnings above the second threshold. On top of this arrangement, the
US system included an actuarial compensation factor that allowed individuals
to compensate for some of the benefit loss later on. The “earnings test” was
reformed in 2000. Before the reform, the test applied to people who continued
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to work and were younger than 67 years and the actuarial compensation of
those between the ages of 65 and 67 years was not actuarially fair. Since the
reform, the test is applied only to individuals younger than 65 years and the
compensation is actuarially fair. Therefore, as a first approximation, it seems
reasonable to abstract from it and to assume that the US has no restrictions
on collecting social security while working.
The social security benefit formula is taken from the US Social Security Ad-
ministration. It is a piecewise linear function of average individual life cycle
earnings, e¯, as in Hugget & Ventura (1999), French (2005), and Nishiyama &
Smetters (2007). The bend points are multiples of AW so they can be taken
directly to the model economy. The US social security replaces 90% of the
first $761 a month, 32% from $761 to $4,586, and 15% above $4,586. This is
equivalent to 0.2, 1.24, and 2.47 in multiples of AW. Therefore, it is written
as
φ(e¯a, ha, a) =
{
0 if a < 62
ϕ(e¯) otherwise
and it is characterized in Figure 5. Note that, as this study assumes that
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Figure 5. Social Security Benefits by Average Earnings
the implicit US tax is zero and ha does not play any role. Other simplifica-
tions worth mentioning are that US social security takes into account the 35
best years of earnings, while this study takes only a simple average over life-
time, capped for individual earnings higher than 247% of AW. It characterizes
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individual average earnings by
e¯′ =
{
e¯·(a−1)+min(wzi,ah,2.47·AW )
a
if a < aˆ
e¯ otherwise
This study abstracts from the fact that US social security requires individ-
uals to be employed for at least 10 years. This is not an issue in the model
because everybody works more than 10 years in any event. In addition, it
assumes that there are no earnings limits on the payroll tax, while in the US
earnings above $100,000 are exempt, roughly 3AW . This seems a harmless
assumption, as the mass of individuals that earn more than 3AW is relatively
small. Although it is harder to tell how many people have life cycle average
earnings above 3AW , there are reasons to believe that they are not above
10%11.
4.1.4 Labor Share
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas, Y = KαL1−α. Labor share, 1−α,
is set to be 0.64 of the value of production, as it is found using NIPA, as is
standard in the macroeconomic literature.
4.2 Parameters Calibrated Together
Preference parameters and the depreciation rate match some key moments of
the US economy. The utility function is separable in consumption and leisure
and can be written as
u(c, 1− h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + λ · (1− h) (2)
This function is characterized by relative risk aversion, σ, and the weight of
leisure, λ.
11According to the CPS March Supplement 2006, only 4.6% of the population earned
more than 3AW .
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Objective. (σ, λ, β, δ) is chosen to match the following key statistics in the
US: a capital–output ratio of 3, an investment–output ratio of 0.2, a labor
share of 0.64, and an employment to population ratio age profile from the ages
of 50 to 80 years. Employment is computed to population ratios from the
same sample of the CPS that was used to compute hourly wages. There are
33 moments and 4 parameters, thus, the parameters are chosen to minimize
the square deviation of the moments from the data and their simulated equiv-
alent. Even though every parameter may impact any moment, the discount
factor, β, is mostly related to the capital–output ratio. Once the algorithm
finds a value of the discount factor that makes the capital–output equal to 3,
the value of α chosen to be 0.36 delivers a labor share of 0.64, and a value
of δ of 0.066 delivers an investment–output ratio of 0.2. The deterministic
component of productivity, zda, the weight of leisure in the utility, λ, and the
relative risk aversion, σ, interact to deliver an employment age profile. It is
not obvious why relative risk aversion plays a role in determining the shape of
the employment profile and this deserves a brief comment. For a high value
of σ, which implies a low elasticity of substitution, the drop in employment
when individuals receive social security benefits will be smaller than if σ were
smaller. The employment age profile will be steeper for smaller values of the
relative risk aversion coefficient.
4.3 Calibration results
Table 1 shows the results of the calibration. Relative risk aversion, σ, is within
the range of values found in the literature, which varies from one to eight; β
is in the low range for life cycle models but the results nonetheless produce a
hump-shaped consumption profile, as shown in Figure 6. The model matches
Table 1
Parameters from the Calibration
A n σ λ β α δ ρ σ2
75 .012 2.50 2.50 .97 .36 .066 .977 .0141
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the ratios of capital and investment to output and labor share perfectly, but
these are not shown in this paper. In addition, the model is successful at
matching the employment to population ratio by age. Figure 7 shows the
match of employment to population for ages 50–80 years. After 80 years, very
few people work and, in this study’s model, nobody works. As the model de-
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Figure 7. Employment Age Profile: Data vs. Model
livers an employment to population age profile similar to the US, it is fair to
express all variables relative to the US to compare both data and simulations,
and it is a key feature for undertaking comparative statistics.
Furthermore, the model matches unintended moments, which is always en-
couraging for the results. It is well known that there is a lot of selection about
employment occurring at older ages. Therefore, the estimates of the wage per
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hour profile could be biased. To address the importance of selection, Figure
8(a) compares the polynomial fit to life cycle wage per hour in CPS, which
is used in the calibration, to simulated life cycle earnings, shown in Figure
8(b). Despite possible biases in the estimates of the polynomial coefficients,
the model produces an earnings age profile consistent with the data. Another
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Age
M
ea
n 
W
ag
e 
pe
r H
ou
r b
y 
Ag
e 
Re
la
tiv
e 
to
 M
ea
n 
W
ag
e 
pe
r H
ou
r
 
 
CPS 1992−2006
Age Component of Productivity (zd
a
)
(a) Wage per Hour
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Age
M
ea
n 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 b
y 
Ag
e 
Re
la
tiv
e 
to
 M
ea
n 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
 
CPS 1992−2006
Model
(b) Earnings
Figure 8. Wage per Hour and Earnings: Data vs. Model
important feature that the model matches very well is the replacement rate:
the model is 40% compared to 45% in the data. The equilibrium payroll tax
in the model is 10.38%, which is similar to the US payroll tax of 12.5%. When
contributions made to Medicaid are discounted in the data, the payroll tax
becomes 9.5%, even closer to the model payroll tax.
5 Policy Experiments
This section evaluates the importance of three key features of social security to
explain cross-national differences in employment to population at older ages.
It also investigates which of the features of social security considered are most
important. All the comparisons are done from a steady state to a steady state.
Before the experiments are described, a reasonable question to ask is whether
the model delivers a similar relationship between features of social security,
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such as generosity, and employment to population at older ages. This is im-
portant to support the results of the model, as the relationship between all
features of social security and employment to population at older ages could
be due to plain luck. If the model did not deliver similar correlations between
generosity and employment to population at older ages, it could point to some
fundamental weakness. To address this issue, Figure 9 shows the correlation
between employment to population at ages 60–64 years (a) and ages 65–69
years (b).
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Figure 9. Generosity and Employment at Older Age: Data vs. Model
The model produces a similar fit of the data, if not better, than a linear re-
gression which is what this study aimed for.
5.1 Description of the Experiments
Section 2 documents large differences in employment to population rates at
older ages across the OECD. It also documents large differences in three key
features of social security: generosity, entitlement ages, and implicit taxes. In
all the experiments, employment to population at older ages and features of so-
cial security are compared relative to the US. Levels are not compared directly
because a subsample of the US population is isolated for the calibration using
micro-data, which is many times not available for other countries. While the
fit of simulations to employment to population age profile is also not perfect
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and such errors could be transmitted to levels, they are not transmitted to
employment to population relative to the US. As a robustness experiment, the
model is recalibrated to include females and the results do not change much.
To account for differences in employment through differences in social security,
the stationary equilibrium of the model is solved for with different parameters
for social security to mimic differences in generosity, entitlement age, and im-
plicit taxes. The results of simulations are compared with OECD employment
data in 2006. To address which feature or combination is more important, the
model is simulated shutting down features of social security one by one to US
levels. In addition, every possible combination of social security features is
explored.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Retirement relative to the US
The main idea of this study is that cross-country differences in social secu-
rity account for large cross-country differences in employment to population
at older ages. Model simulations show that differences in the features of so-
cial security selected account for a substantial fraction of the differences in
employment of older people. This is surprising because there are many things
occurring as people age. On the one hand, people’s health gets worse with
age, so differences in health systems across the OECD may matter. Differ-
ent countries present very different combinations of PAYGO public systems
and defined contribution private systems, in particular, Australia and New
Zealand, which have some version of a defined contribution system. In addi-
tion, many European countries are experiencing a rise in defined contribution
systems.
Figure 10(b) shows how male employment to population at 60–64 years com-
pares in the model and the data. Of course, there are some outliers, such as
Austria or Italy, but given the wide cross-country variation in institutional
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features, it is not surprising. The match would greatly improve if those coun-
tries were dropped and the matching of employment to population at older
ages would remain for a substantial proportion of OECD countries. Some dif-
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Figure 10. Employment Rate 60-64: Data vs. Simulations
ferences in institutional features may show up as differences in employment
to population at older ages by sex. As a robustness exercise, the model is
recalibrated to males and females and the same cross-country simulations are
performed, with the result that the effect on employment to population of
older males and females, relative to the US, is very similar.
In addition, the results may depend on our chosen definition of generosity. Ta-
ble 4 in Appendix C shows correlations between model simulations and data
when different definitions of generosity are used, in particular, gross replace-
ment rates, public replacement rates, and net social security wealth. These
different definitions of generosity are fed into the model and the results do not
change much. The worst fit, with a correlation of 0.48, is found when gross
replacement rates are used, but it remains a big number. Another important
assumption is Duval (2004)’s definition of implicit taxes. To address the im-
portance of this issue, his numbers rather than the 0–1 classification are fed
into the model. The results are shown in Table 5 in Appendix C. The correla-
tions between the model simulations and data remain high. They are 0.59 at
ages 60–64 years and 0.64 at ages 65–69 years. These high correlations persist
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regardless of the definition of generosity.
Furthermore, differences in social security are able to account for the employ-
ment profiles, from ages 50–54 years to ages 70–74 years, of many countries.
Figure 11 shows the fit of model simulations to data in four different coun-
tries, of the many the model can fit: Australia, France, Japan, and Finland,
countries that are markedly different to the US12. It is remarkable how many
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Figure 11. Employment at Older Age: Selected Countries
of the employment profiles at older ages are accounted for by differences in
three features of social security only. However, the next question to address is
which features of social security, or their combination, are most important.
12Figures for every country are available upon request.
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5.3 Which Features of Social Security are Most Impor-
tant?
To account for which features of social security are most important, coun-
terfactual simulations are run. Shutting down social security features to US
levels one by one, and with every possible combination, enables quantifica-
tion of the importance of each feature. Figure 12 summarizes the results of
the counterfactual simulations. From panel (a) we learn that the important
(a) Individual features (b) Interactions
Figure 12. Employment Variation by Age and Social Security Features
features to account for differences in employment to population at older ages
are generosity and implicit taxes but entitlement age is not. Generosity and
implicit taxes each account for a third of the variability in employment at
older ages but they actually overpredict variability when they interact. When
simulations are run allowing for all interactions between each feature of social
security, it is found that differences in entitlement age cannot account for dif-
ferences in employment to population at older ages.
Three different features of social security account for much of the cross-country
variability in employment to population at older ages, but they are also able to
account for average differences in employment relative to the US. This exercise
should be understood as how the average country in the OECD compares with
the US. Figure 13 shows the same decomposition depicted in Figure 12. Social
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(a) Individual features (b) Interactions
Figure 13. Employment Variation by Age and Social Security Features
security features account for a large fraction of the differences in employment
to population at older ages of the average OECD country relative to the US. In
particular, generosity, implicit taxes, and their interaction account for most of
the differences in the average employment to population at older ages relative
to the US. On the other hand, the entitlement age cannot account for much
of the differences, nor its interaction with other social security features.
Many policymakers argue about strategies to encourage their citizens to work
later in life. One of the most popular policy reforms is increasing entitlement
age. However, according to the model of this study, this would barely affect
retirement age. People would change their saving behavior and retire at the
age they planned to in the steady state, and not when they are told to. This
result does not mean that increasing retirement age is a bad policy. In the
steady state, social security would be cheaper, easing the tension that aging
societies place on public finances.
6 Concluding Remarks
There are large cross-country differences in employment to population and
these differences are even bigger at older ages. Many factors may affect this
measure of retirement behavior, but social security seems a natural candidate.
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Social security is a tax and transfer program present in almost every country.
It accounts for a large fraction of countries’ gross domestic product and it
accounts for an even bigger fraction of their tax proceeds. In addition, there
are large cross-country differences in social security features. An interesting
question to answer is how much of these differences in employment to pop-
ulation at older ages social security can account for, in particular, through
three different features only: generosity, implicit taxes, and entitlement ages.
Furthermore, it is interesting, in particular from the policy debate perspective,
to investigate which features of social security are most important.
To answer these questions, this study used a general equilibrium model of life
cycle labor supply decisions, which features idiosyncratic labor income risk and
differences in social security features. After calibrating the model to the US,
the combination of the three features of social security was simulated. It was
found that these features account for a significant amount of the variation in
employment to population at older ages. In addition, social security features
account for differences in average employment across the OECD relative to
the US. Most importantly, differences in social security are able to accurately
fit employment to population age profiles at older ages for many of the OECD
countries.
Among generosity, implicit taxes, and entitlement ages, the first two stand out
as the most important features of social security. Each accounts for one third
of the variability and their interaction slightly over-predicts it. In addition,
they account for most of the differences in average employment to population
age profile relative to the US. Cross-country differences in entitlement ages
can account for neither the variability in employment to population at older
ages, nor differences in the averages relative to the US. The policy message
that can be read is that even though this policy may not encourage people to
work longer, it would reduce public spending in social security in the steady
state.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: OECD Social Security Data
Table 2
OECD Social Security Relative to the US
Replacement Wealth Eligibility
Country Gross Net Public Gross Net Weighted ERA WSS
AUS 1.07 1.19 0.38 1.25 1.22 1.22 55 0
AUT 2.07 2.02 2.07 2.11 1.60 1.60 65 1
BEL 1.09 1.42 1.09 1.16 1.04 1.04 60 1
CAN 1.15 1.29 1.15 1.24 1.22 1.22 60 0
CZR 1.28 1.43 1.28 1.38 1.38 1.38 58.5 0
DN 2.07 2.04 0.59 2.11 1.42 1.42 65 0
FIN 1.45 1.39 1.45 1.60 1.20 1.20 62 1
FR 1.38 1.47 1.38 1.69 1.49 1.49 60 1
DEU 1.11 1.37 1.11 1.31 1.05 1.05 63 1
GRE 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.60 2.24 2.24 60 0
HUN 1.98 2.36 1.31 2.25 2.00 2.00 62 1
IRE 0.88 0.90 0.88 1.11 1.11 1.11 65 1
IT 1.75 1.67 1.75 1.82 1.38 1.38 57 0
JAP 0.87 0.86 2.28 1.02 0.95 0.95 60 0
KOR 1.09 1.04 0.88 1.02 1.05 1.05 55 0
MEX 0.93 0.85 0.12 0.87 0.87 0.87 65 0
NDL 2.28 2.30 0.78 2.96 2.20 2.20 60 0
NZ 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.31 1.07 1.07 65 0
NW 1.53 1.55 1.34 1.85 1.53 1.53 67 0
POL 1.58 1.67 0.80 1.53 1.27 1.27 65 1
POR 1.39 1.55 1.39 1.47 1.47 1.47 55 0
SLV 1.46 1.62 0.62 2.60 1.60 1.60 60 1
SPN 2.10 1.89 2.10 2.22 1.84 1.84 60 0
SWD 1.59 1.43 0.98 1.80 1.29 1.29 61 0
TUR 2.24 2.78 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 60 0
UK 0.79 0.91 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.73 65 0
US 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 62 0
Source: “Pensions at Glance”, OECD (2009) and Duval (2004)
ERA: Early Retirement Age
WSS: Working and Collecting Social Security
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7.2 Appendix B: Alternative Calibration
In the benchmark calibration of the model, this study uses data for white
males from the CPS and then runs simulations under different configurations
of social security. However, the simulations are compared to data from the
OECD, which abstracts from the selection chosen. The model is recalibrated
to US employment to population at ages 50–54,55–59,60–64,65–69, and 70–74
years. It finds that the parameters that match the aggregate moments and the
employment distribution are roughly similar but with a higher value of leisure
in the utility function (λ) to compensate for an employment distribution that
is shifted down when women and other ethnic groups are included. The same
relative wages by age are kept, as there are no big differences by sex.
Table 3
Calibrated Parameters
A n σ λ β α δ ρ σ2
75 .012 2.85 6.00 .958 .36 .066 .977 .0141
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7.3 Appendix C: Numerical Methods
The algorithm used to compute the equilibrium of the model is similar to
Hugget & Ventura (1999). The following steps describe the salient features of
the computation:
1. Choose an initial value of aggregate capital (K0), aggregate labor in
efficiency units (L0), accidental bequests (B0), and payroll tax (τ0).
2. These values are solved by iterating backwards, starting from V (x,A) =
0, the Bellman’s equation of the individual at each point of the individual
state space (k, zw, e¯). As a result, the policy functions c(x, a),k′(x, a),
and h(x, a) are obtained for every a = 1, . . . , A.
3. The distributions over the individual’s state space (Ψa(a)) are computed
using Monte Carlo simulations. First, it is assumed that individuals start
with a capital equal to accidental bequests, average earnings of zero, and
an initial draw of productivity belonging to the stationary distribution
of zw.
4. K0,L0,B0, and τ0 are updated aggregating over the simulated distribu-
tions to K1,L1,B1, and τ1.
5. If aggregate variables in the previous point are close enough and product
markets clear, iterations are stopped. Otherwise, they are continued
until convergence.
90 points for the individual capital are chosen, 30 points for the idiosyncratic
shock, and 4 points for average earnings. Care has to be taken in the compu-
tations: the problem is nonstandard as there is nonconvexity on labor choice.
This is probably not a problem in theory, as this study integrates the value
function over a continuous distribution with no mass points. Nevertheless, in
the numerical computations, the data is on a grid, and this can be a problem.
As this study does not attempt to prove that the objective function is concave
and differentiable, it uses golden section search at each point of the individual
state for each employment status (0 or h¯) and then chooses the maximum
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between these two numbers. Note that golden section search simply requires
that the objective is single peaked on an interval of choice and no derivative is
used at all. A tradeoff between reliability and computational efficiency makes
this type of problem time consuming. For example, solving for the stationary
equilibrium of the model may take between 30 minutes to 3 hours. Calibration
may take from a few days to weeks.
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7.4 Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis
Table 4
Correlation between data and simulations (full sample)
Benchmark simulations
Age Net Replacement Gross Replacement Public Replacement Net Wealth
All Males All Males All Males All Males
20–75 0.64 0.76 0.41 0.44 0.60 0.69 0.55 0.70
50–54 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.36 0.14 0.21 -0.01
55–59 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.31 0.30 0.13 0.08
60–64 0.67 0.71 0.48 0.51 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.69
65–69 0.65 0.64 0.31 0.31 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63
70–74 0.65 0.64 0.37 0.35 0.45 0.51 0.60 0.58
Full sample includes all OECD countries
Benchmark simulations are under the assumption of a 0–1 earnings test
Table 5
Correlation between data and simulations (full sample)
Using Duval (2004)’s definition of implicit taxes
Age Net Replacement Gross Replacement Public Replacement Net Wealth
All Males All Males All Males All Males
20–75 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.58
50–54 0.31 0.28 0.14 0.01 0.31 0.13 0.12 -0.03
55–59 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.15 0.16
60–64 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.56
65–69 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.60
70–74 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.42 0.48 0.56 0.55
Full sample includes all the OECD
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